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In England a plaintiff may recover for libellous statements made on a
privileged occasion only by proof of actual malice; excessive publication,
unnecessary language, and unreasonableness of the charge are evidence, and
evidence only, from which a jury may find the requisite bad faith.8 In the
United States the conditional privilege may be defeated by proof of the
unreasonableness of the statements under the particular circumstances (excessive
publication, unnecessary language, lack of reasonable grounds for belief in
truth, etc.), even though the defendant acts in complete good faith-that is,
without actual malice.9 The principal case seems to adopt the English rule.
The decision indicates that in an action for libel brought by an employee
against an employer who has complete and exclusive control of all or a
substantial portion of the facts, the court will be astute in finding evidence of
malice sufficient to sustain the plaintiff's burden of proof.1o This result seems
desirable as it facilitates effective relief for an employee in cases where, if
his action must depend upon proof of the unreasonableness of the defendantemployer's acts, the employee would fail because of the inaccessibility of the
relevant evidence.
C. B. D.
LEGISLATIONm-Indiana Workmen's Occupational Diseases Act: Silicosi: The
death of over 400 workers on the Gauley Bridge tunnel in West Virginia from
silicosis focused public attention on occupational diseases legislation.'
In an
(real estate board) ; Solow v. Genl. Motors Truck Co. (1933), 64 F. (2d) '105
(creditor). See also: Restatement, Agency (1933), § 470, Comment b.
8 Clark v. Molyneux (1877), L. R. 3 Q. B. D. 237, Bohlen and Harper,
Cases on Torts, p. 629 and cases cited in note 87; also, Hallen, Conditional
Privilege in Defamation (1931), 25 Ill. L. R. 865, 868.
UToothaker v. Conant (1898), 91 Me. 438, 40 A. 331; Russell v. Pennsylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co. (1935), 118 Pa. Super. 351, 179 A. 798; Restatement,
Torts (1938), § 599 ff.; Hallen, Conditional Privilege in Defamation (1931),
25 Ill. L. Rev. 865.
10 The result in the instant case is well supported. The malice necessary to
overcome the defense of privilege may be shown by the manner and circumstances surrounding the publication, or by the publication itself. Sunley v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (1906), 132 Ia. 123, 109 N. W. 463, 12 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 91; Walgreen Co. v. Cochran (1932), 61 F. (2d) 357; Conrad v. AllisChalmers Mfg. Co. (1934), 228 Mo. App. 817, 73 S. W. (2d) 438. The inference of malice may exist in the reckless disregard of the rights of the persons
defamed. Locke v. Bradstreet (1885), 22 F. 771; Conrad v. Allis-Chalmers
Mfg. Co. (1934), 228 Mo. App. 817, 73 S. W. (2d) 438. The privilege is lost
when the libellous statements are made without proper cause or when reasonable care is not exercised in investigating the truth of the statements before
they are published. Locke v. Bradstreet (1885), 22 F. 771; J. Hartman & Co.
v. Hyman (1926), 287 Pa. 78, 134 A. 486, 48 A. L. R. 567; Commonwealth v.
Foley (1928), 292 Pa. 277, 141 A. 50; Rosenberg v. Mason (1931), 157 Va.
215, 160 S. E. 190. In some cases the defendant must sustain the burden of
establishing reasonable grounds for making the libellous statements in order
to establish the privilege. Hodgkins v. Gallagher (1922), 122 Me. 112, 119
A. 68; Russell v. Pennsylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co. (1935), 118 Pa. Super. 351,
179 A. 798. The privilege being lost, the libel becomes actionable per se.
1 N. Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1936, p. 5. See Hearings before the Subcommittee of
the Committee on Labor on H. J. Res. 449, 74h Congress, 2d Sess. (1936).
500,000 to 1,200,000 individuals in the mechanical and manufacturing industries
of the United States alone are exposed to a silicosis hazard. Since the effective
date of the Indiana act 12 cases of occupational diseases due to dust have
appeared before the Industrial Board, 2 cases being definitely classed as

RECENT CASE NOTES
effort to meet the problem many states passed compensation statutes for
2
disabilities and death due to silicosis and other occupational diseases.
"Pneumoconiosis" is the generic term for lung diseases resulting from the
inhalation of dust. "Silicosis" is the more definite, limited term describing
one of the diseases produced by breathing air containing silica dust in minute
particles.3 The clinical characteristics of silicosis are a shortness of breath,
a decreased chest expansion, a lessened capacity for work, an absence of fever,
and an increased susceptibility to tuberculosis, some or all of which symptoms
may be present, and the characteristic X-ray findings. 4
Liability Prior to the Occupational Diseases Act: In nearly all states where
the statutes do not clearly compensate for silicosis the employee's remedy lies
in the common law.5 Indiana has allowed a recovery at common law (supplemented by the Employer's Liability Act of 1911; Burns' Ind. Stat. 1933, § 40-1111)
for death from disease contracted because of the employer's negligence.6 The
other states allowing recovery at common law base the action upon the
negligence of the employer, either in failing to warn of a danger the employee
was incurring or in failing to provide a safe place to work.7 The cases
silicosis. See Year Book of Indiana (1938), p. 1018-1019, published by the
Division of Accounts and Statistics.
Sayers, Silicosis (1932), p. 2-6, published by permission of the Surgeon General, U. S. Public, Health Service, No. B-52, shows a knowledge of silicosis
from the time of Hippocrates to the present.
2The Indiana act became effective June 7, 1937, Acts of 1937, c. 69, p. 334;
Burns' Ind. Stat. 1933, § 40-2201 et seq. See notes 19, 20, 21 for a list of the
acts compensating for silicosis. The customary advances of the English in labor
legislation is shown by the fact that the English Workmen's Compensation Act
was amended in 1906 to include occupational diseases, Stat. at Large, 6 Edw.
VII (1906), c. 58, § 8(1), p. 332.
3 Sayers and Jones, Silicosis and Dust Diseases (Medical Aspects and Control) (1936), p. 1, 2, published by the Division of Industrial Hygiene, U. S.
Public Health Service, No. B-1345. "Silicosis, in simple lay language, is caused
by breathing silica dust. Tiny particles of silica, too fine to be seen even with
a good microscope, are breathed into the lungs. A chemical action leads nature
in self-defense to build a wall of fibre around the poison. An increasing number of these fibrous lumps--"Nodules" to you and the X-ray man-gradually
block off the blood supply and finally the air-passageways. Distressing shortness of breath and finaly plain suffocation may result. Naturally the victims
are "susceptible" to tuberculosis which carries off about three-fourths of them
while pneumonia gets another 15 per cent. Enlarged hearts from attempting
to force blood through hardening arteries, completes the story," Andrews, The
Tragedy of Silicosis (1936), 26 Am. Labor Leg. Rev. 4.
4This is the definition adopted by the Committee on Pneumoconiosis of
the Industrial Hygiene Section of the Am. Public Health Assn. at the Nov.,
1932 meeting.
5 Mississippi and Arkansas still have no compensation laws, although
Arkansas has amended its constitution to allow the enactment of such a statute.
For a list of the statutes clearly compensating silicosis see notes 21-23.
6 General Printing Co. v. Umback (1935), 100 Ind. App. 285, 195 N. E.
281. This case was for lead poisoning resulting from the negligent operation
of the ventilating system. In a scholarly opinion the court recognized the split
of authority, but ruled that the case did not come under the Workmen's Compensation Act as the disease was an occupational disease and not a death
resulting from an injury by accident.
7"Jacque 'v.Locke Insulator Corp. (1934), 70 F. (2d) 680, cert. den. 293
U. S. 585; Jellico Coal Co. v. Adkins (1923), 197 Ky. 684, 247 S. W. 972;
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denying a recovery at common law are based on the dubious reasoning that
a "safe" place to work does not necessarily mean a "sanitary" place, coupled
with the dictum that occupational diseases were unknown to the common law, 8
or in the theory that workmen's compensation acts exclude remedies not granted
therein.9
The standard of due care has been held to mean only a compliance with the
general standards of the industry,' 0 though some courts also impose a duty
to warn on grounds of the master's superior knowledge."1 The defenses of
assumption of risk and contributory negligence would be an additional bar to
recovery at common law except in the jurisdictions where the defenses are
abolished by statute. 1 2 The statute of limitations is of particular importance
in occupational diseases cases. An occupational disease, such as silicosis, does
not occur at once but results from long continued exposure.13 The statutory
period has been held to begin to run from the date of the initial exposure; 1 4
the better view is that it runs from the date the work ceased.' 5
Donnelly v. Minneapolis Mfg. Co. (1924), 161 Minn. 240, 201 N. W. 305;
Jones v. Rinehart & D. Co. (1933), 113 W. Va. 414, 160 S. E. 482.
8McCreery v. Libby-Owens-Ford Glass Co. (1936), 363 Ill. 321, 2 N. E.
(2d) 290, 105 A. L. R. 75.
In Adams v. Acme White Lead and Coloring Works (1914), 182 Mich. 187,
148 N. W. 485, a suit for lead poisoning under the workmen's compensation act,
recovery was denied, with the dictum that there was no recovery at common
law, apparently because there were no cases giving it. The dictum of this
case has been cited with approval in many subsequent cases. See: Zajuchuck
v. Willard Storage Battery Co. (1922), 106 Ohio St. 538, 140 N. E. 405; Ewers
v. Buckeye Clay Pot Co. (1928), 29 Ohio App. 396, 163 N. E. 577; Gordon v.
Travelers' Ins. Co. (Tex. Civ. App. 1926), 287 S. W. 911.
9 Webb v. Tubize-Chatillon Corp. (1932), 45 Ga. App. 744, 165 S. E. 775;
Mabley & Carew Co. v. Lea (1934), 129 Ohio St. 69, 193 N. E. 745. That this
doctrine is in disfavor, see Jellico Coal Co. v. Adkins (1923), 197 Ky. 684,
690, 247 S. W. 972, 975; Jones v. Rinehart & D. Co. (1933), 113 W. Va.
414, 425, 169 S. E. 487.
10 Thompson v. United Lab. Co. (1915), 221 Mass. 276, 108 N. E. 1042;
Allen Gravel Co. v. Curtis (1935), 173 Miss. 416, 161 So. 670 (which held
the master was bound to know scientific facts showing the risk that would not
be known to the uneducated worker.
11 Penn. Pulverizing Co. v. Butler (1932), 61 F. (2d) 311, where liability
was denied as there had been a compliance with all precautionary and safety
devices as used in the industry generally.
12 The Indiana Employer's Liability Act, Acts of 1911, c. 88, p. 145, Burns'
Ind. Stat. 1933, sec. 40-1101---40-1114, was sufficient to abolish the common law
defenses in a suit at law for an occupational disease although it is not an
express abolition in every case. See General Printing Co. v. Umback (1935),
100 Ind. App. 285, 195 N. E. 281. Cf. Pa. Gen. Stat. (Purdon 1936), Tit. 77,
sec. 41.
IsSee Sayers and Jones, ot. cit. supra note 3, p. 9, 13-20. Cf. the Indiana
Occupational Diseases Act (sec. 5e), extending the exposure period to three
years for silicosis or asbestosis and N. C. Pub. Laws (1935), c. 123, sec. 1(g).
In Peru Plow and Wheel Co. v. Industrial Comm. (1924-), 311 Ill. 216, 142
N. E. 546, a workmen's compensation case, the court stated, "Occupational
diseases are not covered by the compensation act, although not all diseases
are to be excluded from the purview of the compensation law. An occupational disease is a diseased condition arising gradually from the character of
the work in which the employee is engaged. It does not occur suddenly, but
is a matter of slow development. An occupational disease is not an accident."
14 Schmidt v. Merchant's Dispatch Co. (1936), 270 N. Y. 287, 200 N. E. 824.
15 Grant v. Fisher Flouring (1935), 181 Wash. 576, 44- P. (2d) 193.
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Massachusetts is the only state holding that occupational diseases are within
the meaning of "injury" in the workmen's compensation act, although some
statutes compensate expressly for injuries or diseases.1 6 Most states exclude
silicosis from their workmen's compensation laws on the theory that occupational
diseases are not an injury by accident or a traumatic injury.17 Diseases that
arise abruptly are sometimes held compensable as accidents though an occupational diseases act exists.1 8
The need for adequate protection for the victims of occupational diseases led
to the amendment of the workmen's compensation acts in some states and to
the passage of separate occupational diseases laws in others.
The Indiana Occupational Diseases Act: Three types of coverage have been
employed in occupational diseases legislation: (1) a general coverage including
injuries and diseases,1 9 (2) a limited coverage compensating only for those
diseases listed in a schedule, 2 0 and (3) a broad statute covering all occupational
diseases. 2 1 The Indiana act is of the last type. The possibility that a general
coverage statute might become perverted into a form of health and sickness
insurance has led to widespread adoption of the scheduled coverage, offering
16The Mass. act compensated only for "personal injury" only. In re
Hurle (1914), 217 Mass. 223, 104. N. R. 336 awarded compensation for optic
neuritis induced by poisonous coal tar gases. See also Sullivan's Case (1929),
265 Mass. 497, 164. N. E. 457 containing a similar holding that "personal
injury" was broad enough to cover occupational diseases. Cf. the following
cases, where, although the claimant contracted what is usually regarded as an
occupational disease, the courts held it was in fact an accident and therefore
compensable: United Paperboard Co. v. Lewis (1917), 65 Ind. App. 356, 117
N. E. 276; Standard Cabinet Co. v. Landgrave (1921), 76 Ind. App. 593,
132 N. E. 661. Victory Sparkler and Specialty. Co. v. Francks (1925), 147
Md. 368, 128 A. 635, 44 A. L. R. 363, a case at common law for phosphorus
poisoning, and the court held it was not an occupational disease, but an accidental injury, and therefore under the workmen's compensation law. See
notes 21-23, supra, for a list of statutes compensating for injury or disease.
17 General Printing Co. v. Umback (1935), 100 Ind. App. 285, 195 N. E.
281, 284. (In Indiana "accident" is defined as "an unlooked for mishap, an
untoward event which is not expected or designed," General, etc., Corp. v.
Weirick (1916), 77 Ind. App. 242, 245, 133 N. E. 391, 392); Miller v. Amer.
Steel & Wire Co. (1916), 90 Conn. 349, 97 A. 345; Renkel v. Industrial Comm.
(1923), 109 Ohio St. 152, 147 N. E. 834.
lsRamsay v. Sullivan Mining Co. (1931), 51 Idaho 366, 6 P. (2d) 856;
Lurye v. Stern Bros. Dept. Store (1937), 275 N. Y. 182, 9 N. E. (2d) 828;
Vaughan & Rush v. Stump (1932), 156 Okla. 125, 9 P. (2d) 764.
19 Calif. Gen. Law (Deering 1931) 4749, p. 2276; Mass. Gen. Law (1932),
c. 152, sec. 26; Mo. Rev. Stat. (1929), c. 28, art. 1, sec. 3305, as amended, Acts
1937, p. 382; N. Y. Consol. Laws (Cahill 1931-35 Supp.), c. 66, sec. 3 (2); N.
D. Laws 1935, c. 286, sec. 1; Wis. Stat. 1933, sec. 102.01; 33 U. S. C. A. sec.
902, (44 Stat. 1424 (1927)).
20 Dela. Acts 1937, c. 241, p. 716; Mich. Acts 1937, c. 61, p. 77; Ky Stat.
(Carroll-Baldwin 1936), sec. 4880; Minn. Stat. (Mason 1927), sec. 4-327(9);
Neb. Acts 1937, c. 107, p. 367; N. J. Laws 1937, Title 34, c. 15, art. 30-35; N.
Y. Consol. Law (Cahill 1931), c. 66, sec. 3; N. C. Pub. Law (1935), c. 123,
sec. 1(b); Ohio Gen. Code (Page Supp. 1935), sec. 1465-68a; Penn. Acts
1937, c. 552, p. 2714; R. I. Laws 1936, c. 2358, sec. 2; Wash. Acts 1937, c. 212,
p. 1031; W. Va. Acts 1935, c. 79, sec. 5.
21 Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930), sec. 5226; Ill.
Laws 1935-36, 3rd Spec. Sess.,
p. 40 (Ill.Rev. Stat. 1937, c. 48, sec. 172.1-172.35); Indiana Acts 1937,
c. 69, p. 334.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
advantages in ease of administration and proof. 2 2 A disease not included in
the schedule would not be compensable, and new types of occupational diseases
are being found each year. For this reason a broad general coverage is fairest
to the workman and more desirable. 2 3 Judicious administration is necessary
in any type statute to prevent abuses.
The Indiana act provides (§§4a, 4d) for an election to come under the
statute. This election is extended to all employers and to the employees already
employed at the time the act took effect. The Workmen's Compensation Act
presumes the employer has accepted the provisions unless there is an election
to the contrary, 2 4 but the result should be the same in the final analysis, as
employers not coming under either act lose the common law defenses. The
Occupational Diseases Act offers additional advantages to the employer in
lowered costs and a speedy adjudication of all claims by an administrative
25
tribunal.
Employees who have contracted silicosis but were not disabled prior to the
Medical
effective date of the act raise the question of accrued liability.
authorities recognize three stages of silicosis; only in the third stage does the
impairment become acute and prevent the employe from continuing his normal
occupation. 2 6 Special treatment of the problem was necessary to prevent widespread discharge of these workers. The Indiana act (§§ Se, 26) limits compensation to cases of disablement when the last exposure to the hazards of the
disease occurred on or after the effective date of the statute, June 7, 1937.
An employee is conclusively deemed to have been exposed when he is employed in
an occupation or process in which the hazard of an occupational disease exists.
The employer liable is the one in whose employment the employee was last
exposed, regardless of the length of time of the exposure. In the case of
silicosis or asbestosis the only employer liable is the last employer in whose
employment the employee was last exposed during a period of sixty days or
more after the effective date, and an exposure of less than sixty days after the
effective date is not deemed a last exposure. Compensation has been denied
under the terms of this section in the case of In re Jeffries,27 the only Indiana
22Andrews, Compensate All Occupational Diseases (1927), 17 Am. Labor
Leg. Rev. 261; an editorial in 18 Am. Labor Leg. Rev. 374 (1928).
23 "The contention is made that this paragraph 28 extends the Workmen's
Compensation Law so as to make it applicable to any accident arising out of
and in the course of the employment. This in substance would make workmen's compensation the equivalent of life and health insurance," Goldberg v.
954 Marcy Corp. (1938), 276 N. Y. 313, 12 N. E. (2d) 311.
24 Indiana Workmen's Compensation Act of 1929, sec. 10. Indiana Workmen's Occupational Diseases Act, sec. 3a.
25 The lowered cost of an election to come under the terms of the act is
shown by the fact that an action for damages may be as high as $10,000
(sec. 3a), while the maximum that may be paid as compensation under the
statute is $5,000 (sec. 11a).
26Sayers and Jones, op. cit. supra note 3, p. 18, 19, "The individual's
capacity for work becomes seriously impaired . . . (in the third stage)".
27 (Ind. App. 1938), 14 N. E. (2d) 751. "We conclude further that, by
virtue of the terms of sec. 32 of the act, no employer would be liable for
compensation in any case of silicosis in which the disablement on which the
claim is predicated, occurred prior to the effective date of the act. So an
exposure to the hazards of silicosis previous to the effective date of the act
could not be taken into consideration in determining the last employer in
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case construing the act, as the period of exposure was less than sixty days.
A recent Illinois case construing the comparable section of the Illinois act,
from which the Indiana act was copied, held this section to limit the definition
of "last employment" and not that of "exposure"; "sixty days" was held to
28
Having thus
mean a single sixty day period and not sixty working days.
limited the act to a definite employer to prevent wholesale discharging of
employees, the Indiana act (§ 24) allows a waiver of full compensation by
any employee who had contracted silicosis or asbestosis prior to the effective
date but was not disabled. Notice of the waiver had to be given to the
Industrial Board within sixty days after the statute became effective, and
These provisions did not
it was subject to the approval of the Board.
completely solve the problem of accrued liability but were probably sufficient
to enable the employee to retain his job. As two years have passed since the
act took effect, this question is losing importance.
Lump sum payments are allowed when in the best interests of the parties,
although in cases of complete disability petition for commutation of the award
to a lump sum may not be made for six months. The act denies a review of
an award when the Board orders it paid in a lump sum (§20i), although all
other awards may be modified because of a change in conditions. In cases of
partial disability the acceptance of a lump sum would work a hardship on the
employee whose disability later became complete. Cautious administration
is necessary to prevent abuses of this provision.
Many limitations are placed on recovery even though a disease may be
proved to exist. Cases which may be compensated under the Workmen's
Compensation Act are not recoverable under the Occupational Diseases Act
(§20 L), although provision is made for the admendment of claims erroneously
filed. Compensation is denied for diseases or death intentionally self-inflicted,
or due to intoxication, during the commission of a felony or misdemeanor, or
wilful failure to use safety devices or obey written rules posted, or refusal
to perform a statutory duty (§§14a, 14b). The harshness of these provisions
calls for the cooperation of the employer in safety measures, as supplying
safety masks, free medical examinations and shifting from one type of work
to another to lessen exposure. The cost of cooperation would pay in the form
of reduced insurance costs.
ELEMENTS OF LuABLrry UNDER THE INDIANA AcT: Although the Indiana
act offers a broad coverage for all occupational diseases, many important elements come into consideration in order for liability to attach.
(1)
No compensation is payable unless disablement occurs within one year
from the last day of the last exposure to the hazards of the disease, except in
cases of silicosis or asbestosis, in which cases disablement must occur within
whose employment the employee was last exposed to the hazards of the
disease, during a period of sixty days, or more, after the effective date of
the act."
28 Morris Metal Products Co. v. Industrial Comm. (1939), 370 Ill. 292, 18
N. E. (2d) 899. The dictum is interesting, "If after such period of sixty
days or more the employee enters another employment, the first employer
remains liable until the employee has been exposed, as defined in the act during
a period of sixty days with the second employer, when the latter under the
statute becomes the 'last employer'."
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three years (§Se). This section raises the problem of what is a "disablement"
and when, where, and what is an "exposure" to the hazards of an occupational
disease. "Disablement" is defined (§Sd) as the event of becoming disabled from
earning full wages in the work in which the employee was last engaged when
last exposed to the hazards of an occupational disease by the employer from
whom he claims compensation. The employee is conclusively deemed (§26)
to have been exposed to the hazards of an occupational disease when for any
length of time, however short, he is employed in an occupation in which the
hazard of an occupational disease exists. Dr. Sayers lists 33 uses of silica in
industry, 29 and presumably there is a hazard of silicosis in each of these uses.
The industries in which a silicosis hazard occurs are well known because of
the vast amount of research done in the field, but in the case of other occupational diseases extensive litigation may be necessary before the presence of an
occupational disease hazard is recognized in some industries.
(2) This raises the question of what is an occupational disease. The
definition of the statute (§6a) defines it as "a disease arising out of and in
the course of the employment.8 0 Ordinary diseases of life to which the general
public is exposed outside of the employment shall not be compensable, except
where such diseases follow as an incident of the occupational disease." The
section (§6b) continues, "A disease shall be deemed to arise out of the employment, only if there is apparent to the rational mind, upon consideration of all
the circumstances, a direct causal connection3l between the conditions under
which the work is to be performed and the occupational disease, and which
can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work as a result of
the exposure occasioned by the nature of the employment and which can be
fairly traced to the employment as the proximate cause,8 2 and which does not
29 Sayers and Jones, op. cit. supra note 3, p. 3, 4, 5. The chief industries
with a definite silicosis hazard are sandblasting, metal grinding and polishing, foundry work, glass and asbestos manufacturing, and rock drilling.
80 "Arising out of and in the course of the employment" should be given an
interpretation similar to that given the phrase under the Workmen's Compensation Act. See definition used in United Paperboard Co. v. Lewis (1917),
65 Ind. App. 356, 117 N. E. 276, 277.
41 "Causal connection" has been distinguished from "Proximate cause" as
being more remote in the chain of circumstances, Ala. Power Co. v. Bass
(1928), 218 Ala. 586, 119 So. 625, 628. The question naturally arises whether
a "direct causal connection" is not more akin to proximate cause than a mere
"Causal connection".
The statutory definition seems to have pulled together all possible explanations used by the courts in workmen's compensation cases. "It 'arises out of
the employment' when there is apparent to the rational mind upon consideration of all circumstances, a causal connection between the conditions under
which the work is required to be performed and the resulting injury," In re
McNicol (1913), 215 Mass. 497, 102 N. E. 697. See further, Causation in
Workmen's Compensation (1937), 13 Ind. L. J. 164.
32 "Proximate cause is defined to be any cause which, in actual and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause, produced the
result complained of, and without which the result would not have occurred,"
Moran v. Paledor (1926), 84 Ind. App. 266, 273, 151 N. E. 140.
"The term 'legal cause' is used to denote the fact that the sequence of
events through which the actor's tortious act or omission has brought about
(in fact caused) the harm which another has sustained is such as to make
it just to hold the actor responsible therefor," Harper, Law of Torts (1933),
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come from a hazard to which the workman would have been equally exposed
outside of the employment. 3 3 The disease must be incidental to the character
of the business and not independent of the relation of employer and employee.
The disease need not have been forseen or expected but after its contraction it
must appear to have had its origin in a risk connected with the employment and
to have flowed from that source as a rational consequence.' '3 4 The determination of what is an occupational disease from the statutory definition will
involve much litigation in the coming years. Under the Indiana act the
problem of causation is thrust squarely into the act, with the qualifying words
of the definition apparently to delimit "proximate cause" even more narrowly
to the employment. Because the causation factor is so important in the definition, the existence of an occupational disease in one instance will have to be
confined to the facts of the individual case and will be of little value in determining what is an occupational disease in subsequent litigation.85
(3) The most interesting change from the usual procedure in compensation legislation is the proof of disability (§8n). "All compensation payments
named and provided for in this section shall mean and be defined to be only
for such occupational diseases and disabilities therefrom as are proved by
competent evidence, of which there are or have been objective symptoms proven,
not within the physical or mental control of the employee himself." This section rules out all proof of subjective symptoms, 3 6 but the definition of "objective
symptoms" has not been clarified. As X-ray evidence has always been considered indispensible in the diagnosis of silicosis this section should not be a
serious limitation on recovery, 3 7 but if there should be some occupationdl disease, the symptoms of which are not capable of being visualized or palpitated,
recovery would be doubtful. This section should be effective in ending
fraudulent claims.
(4) As an aid in the proof of an occupational disease hazard the act provides (§20k) for the appointment of an industrial hygienist, engineer, physician or chemist to make a survey of the place of employment and testify as
sec. 110, p. 258. If instead of "the actor's tortious conduct or omission", the
phrase, "the physical conditions under which the work is to be performed"
is substituted, it is apparent that this part of the definition is merely to tie
up the causal connection between the conditions of work and the disease
that resulted.
33 This clause is to remove the possibility that the occupational diseases
act might be used as a general health insurance act.
34 While the element of foreseeability has always been used in negligence
cases, apparently the legislature has adopted a "foreseeability in retrospect"
concept. The question might arise whether this broadens the idea of proximate cause, but the qualifications as to origin and consequence apparently
would limit this sentence with the result that the definition would be merely
an overstatement of the rules of proximate cause.
35 Bartlett, What is an OccupationalDisease?, published in the Amer. Bar
Assn., Section on Insurance Law, (1938-39), Cleveland meeting, p. 312-328.
36 An application of the rule of statutory construction, "exPressio unius est
exclusio alterigs" would give this result. "Where authority is given to do a
particular thing, and the mode of doing it is prescribed, it is limited to be
done in that mode; all other modes are excluded," Lewis' Sutherland on
Statutory Construction (1904), sec. 492, p. 919.
37Hayhurst, The Diagnosis of Silicosis (1936), 26 Am. Labor Leg. Rev.
61, 63.
38 Sayers and Jones, oP. cit. supra note 3, p. 14-16.
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to his findings. The expert testimony gained may be of value in determining
the Industries in Indiana with the greatest silicosis hazard, as well as the
other occupational diseases present. However, different occupations in the
same industry have different degrees of exposure to the hazards of silicosis.
Studies of the dust concentration show a much higher exposure in certain
occupations constituting only a small part of the industry's total man-hours than
in other occupations having a close technological relationship. 8 8 Unless a
survey be made of each separate occupation under every possible condition
the usefulness of this provision will be slight in individual cases.
CoNcLusioN: The schedule of awards is similar in form to that of the
Workmen's Compensation Act and is not within the scope of this note. Most
variations are explained because of the difference in the nature of an occupational disease and an injury.8 9
The fear of loss of employment has caused labor groups in the dusty
industries to oppose compulsory periodic medical examinations. 4 0 The Indiana
act calls for medical examination only after disablement (§13) which is of
no value as a preventive measure. Periodic medical examinations are necessary to determine the effectiveness of the preventive practises of an industry but
it will not be a possibility until some form of security of employment is
offered along with it.41
Once a worker contracts silicosis there is no known cure; prevention remains the solution. The mechanical and engineering methods of prevention
42
are effective though distasteful to the workers and costly to the employers.
Affirmative public health acts requiring their use are a natural supplement to
the Occupational Diseases Act and would materially reduce silicosis in
industry.
B. W.
MORTGAGES-PLACE OF RacoRINc--Action to foreclose a mortgage. Defendant, a resident of Allen County, owned two grain elevators located respectively
on lands leased from the Baltimore and Ohio Ry. Co. and the Wabash R. Co.,
in DeKalb and LaGrange Counties. The leases' provided that the defendant

39 An inexplicable variation is the limitation of burial expense (sec. 7c) to
$100 in occupational diseases cases, while it is $150 in the Workmen's Compensation Act (sec. 39).
40Nelson, Silicosis Problem Solved in Visconsin (1936), 26 Am. Labor
Leg. Rev. 53, 57.
41 Sayers and Jones, op. cit. supra note 3, p. 27, "Preliminary and periodic
physical and roentgenological examination should be made of all employees
engaged in industrial processes where there is a potential if not actual exposure
to excessive concentrations of silica in the atmosphere."
42 Sayers and Jones, op. cit. supra note 3, p. 28-30. The use of methods
(1) to prevent the esape of the dust into the workroom atmosphere, (2) to
remove the dust from the atmosphere, and (3) the use of mechanical personal
protective equipment is advocated.
In Science News Letter, Mar. 18, 1939, Vol. 35, p. 163, is an account of the
use of aluminum dust inhalations as a preventive of silicosis. The aluminum
dust so inhaled dissolves in the body fluids to form colloidal aluminum hydroxide
which is then absorbed and firmly held on the silica crystals and renders the
dust harmless.
1 The language of the instrument quoted in the present case seemed to
indicate that one of the leases was only a license but the court in its treatment of the case considered both as leases. The writer in his discussion of

